



Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL
CONFERENCE

Zagreb Applied Ethics
Conference 2015

PROGRAM & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Zagreb, June 29 – July 1, 2015

Borongaj Campus • Center for Croatian Studies • Lecture hall “Zagreb”
Borongajska cesta 83d • Zagreb • Croatia
<http://www.upf.hr> <http://www.hrstud.unizg.hr>

Contents

- 5** Conference Program
- 11** Plenary Lectures
- 15** Contributed Papers
- 41** Biographical Notes
- 51** Our Previous Conferences
- 52** Prolegomena – Journal of Philosophy
- 53** Organizing Committee

Conference Program

Monday, 29 June 2015

09:30–09:45 Opening of the conference

JOSIP TALANGA, *Head of the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb*

DAVOR PEĆNIAK, *President of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy*

09:45–11:00 Plenary lecture

DAVID HEYD, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*
Conservation – for whom?

11:00–11:30 Coffee break

11:30–12:30 Session I

RADIM BĚLOHRAD, *Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic*

Narrative identity, self-interested concern, and post-humous interests

ROSA RANTANEN, *University of Turku, Finland*
Meaning in life and life extension

12:30–14:00 Lunch break

14:00–15:30 Session II

FRIDERIK KLAMPFER, *University of Maribor, Slovenia*

DEJAN SAVIĆ, *University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*

Responsibility for climate change: does the argument from inconsequentialism extend to small countries?

HARALD STELZER, *University of Graz, Austria*

Normative aspects of decision-making frameworks under uncertainty

KONSTANTINA MYLONA-GIANNAKAKOU, *National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece*
Agricultural biotechnology, genetic modification and ethical issues

15:30–16:00 Coffee break

16:00–17:30 Session III

ALINA OMERBASIC, *University of Potsdam, Germany*
The notion of harm in reproductive ethics

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Inferring intent from collective behavior: some reflections on the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding the genocide convention violation

Tuesday, 30 June 2015

09:30–10:45 Plenary lecture

ERIC T. OLSON, *University of Sheffield, UK*
Death and immortality

10:45–11:15 Coffee break

11:15–12:45 Session IV

DARKO POLŠEK, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
When should we allow choice architectures? Behavioral economics and politics

MIHOVIL LUKIĆ, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Ethics of nudging. Finding the criteria for when nudging is acceptable

DIJANA MAGĐINSKI, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Altruism in the Cloud – why do we help strangers online?

12:45–14:15 Lunch break

14:15–15:45 Session V

JOANNA ROZYSKA, *University of Warsaw, Poland*

Setting limits to research risk

EVANGELOS PROTOPAPADAKIS, *National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece*

Truth-telling and medical duty: placebo treatments and potential moral conflicts

GIULIA CAVALIERE, *KU Leuven, Belgium / Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands / University of Padova, Italy*

Reasons and intuitions in ethical debates

15:45–16:15 Coffee break

16:15–17:45 Session VI

MARKO JURJAKO, *University of Rijeka, Croatia*

Practical rationality and instrumental learning in psychopaths

LUCA MALATESTI, *University of Rijeka, Croatia*

FILIP ČEČ, *University of Rijeka, Croatia*

Self-knowledge and moral responsibility: the case of psychopathy

KRITIKA MAHESHWARI, *University of Birmingham, UK*

Personhood in disorder of consciousness and its ethical implications

Wednesday, 1 July 2015

09:30–11:00 Session VII

LOVRO SAVIĆ, *University of Groningen, Netherlands*

Psychiatric medicalization and oppression

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Sex reassignment surgery: Why should we keep the gate-keepers?

KATARZYNA MARCHEWKA, *Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland*
Values in psychotherapeutic relationship

11:00–11:30 Coffee break

11:30–13:00 Session VIII

OLGA MARKIČ, *University of Ljubljana, Slovenia*
Epistemology and ethical considerations of neuroscience

KAROLINA KUDLEK, *University of Zagreb, Croatia*
Misdirected means of moral bioenhancement

MIRKO DANIEL GARASIC, *Tel Aviv University, Israel*
Why should I say out loud if I've cognitively enhanced myself?

13:00–14:15 Lunch break

14:15–15:45 Session IX

WALDEMAR BRYŚ, *Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany*
Global ethics: In search of alternatives

NENAD CEKIĆ, *University of Belgrade, Serbia*
Is sexual ethics applied?

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER, *University of Salzburg, Austria*
Is the sexualization of girlhood a social pathology?

15:45–16:00 Closing of the conference

17:30–19:00 Guided sightseeing of Zagreb for participants of the conference

20:30 Farewell banquet

Plenary Lectures

Conservation – for whom?

DAVID HEYD

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Jerusalem, Israel)
david.heyd@mail.huji.ac.il

The conservation of natural entities (like animal species, plants, habitats, landscapes – even the planet as a whole) has become an urgent practical issue in the face of urbanization, deforestation, pollution and the exploitation of natural resources by human beings. This paper aims, though, at analyzing the theoretical debate about the justification of conservation policies and the concept of value implied in such justification. The general thesis of the paper is that value is essentially a “person-affecting” concept and accordingly the debate about bio-conservation necessarily raises the question “for whom?”. The anthropocentric character of this analysis of value does not imply an instrumental attitude to the natural environment and is compatible with the widespread view about the intrinsic value of some species and natural environments. But it denies the conceptual possibility of nature having value independently of the existence of human beings. However, the extinguishable human aspiration of self-transcendence constantly draws us to the ascription of value to nature from “an impersonal” point of view. For the value of our own existence as a species cannot be given meaning within a purely person-affecting conception.

Death and immortality

ERIC T. OLSON

University of Sheffield – Department of Philosophy (Sheffield, UK)
e.olson@sheffield.ac.uk

That we are mortal is an important fact. In order to think about its significance – about whether it is a good thing or a bad one, for instance – we need to know what it would mean to be immortal. But there are different sorts of immortality. We need to contrast our mortality with the simplest and most straightforward alternative: to imagine that we don't have to die but leave all else, as far as possible, the same. The result, I argue, is a species of immortality very different from those most commonly discussed.

Contributed Papers

Narrative identity, self-interested concern, and post-humous interests

RADIM BĚLOHRAD

Masaryk University in Brno – Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
(Brno, Czech Republic)
radimbelohrad@gmail.com

My paper focuses on recent developments in Marya Schechtman's theory of personal identity and proposes an extension of the theory that offers a plausible framework for the discussion of non-experiential and post-humous interests. Schechtman's early account of personal identity was the Narrative Self-Constitution View. This view is essentially a psychological theory, because it analyzes personal identity in terms of an elaborate psychological unity (narrative unity). As a result, personal identity can only hold between beings with rich psychological properties, excluding human fetuses or humans in permanent vegetative state. In the light of certain bioethical arguments, Schechtman has abandoned her early theory in favor of what is called the Person Life View. Narrative unity still plays an important role in Person Life View, but there are important differences between this view and her former narrative theory, including the fact that narratives are not subjective, but inter-subjective phenomena, the fact that narratives can even be maintained in the absence of the narrator, and the fact that narratives can include stages in which a human being can no longer have experiences. I will argue that this new and modified version of narrative theory can plausibly be extended to explain our self-interested concern for the non-experiential stages of our lives and even to account for our concern to have our interests posthumously satisfied. If plausible, this account will have implications for the debate on organ harvesting.

Sex reassignment surgery: why should we keep the gatekeepers?

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies,
Department of Philosophy (Zagreb, Croatia)
tomislav.bracanovic@hrstud.hr

Ethical debates about sex reassignment surgery tend to revolve around the question whether gender dysphoria, as the condition that sex reassignment surgery is supposed to alleviate and/or treat, should be classified as mental disorder. This presentation focuses on the arguably independent question: (a) should sex reassignment surgery become freely available and performed on demand of a person who considers it necessary for his or her well-being, self-determination or identity (as many transgender scholars and activists maintain) or (b) should it be performed only after qualified mental health professionals (occasionally referred to as the “gatekeepers”) evaluate the person and officially approve the procedure? Various data on sex reassignment surgery and studies on postoperative transsexuals’ quality of life will be analyzed from the perspective of standard principles of medical ethics such as beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice. It will be argued that when it comes to sex reassignment surgery – regardless of the question whether gender dysphoria is a mental disorder – some sort of “gatekeeping” policy is a justified form of paternalism that not only protects the interests of persons seeking the surgery but also safeguards the boundaries of humane and evidence-based medicine.

Global ethics: in search of alternatives

WALDEMAR BRYŚ

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Berlin, Germany)
waldemarbrys@gmail.com

The following paper has two aims: First, to consider the reasons why traditional moral theory has had such great difficulty in providing us with an adequate account of global ethics, and second, to use this analysis for the development of an alternative approach based on an ethical reading of *Be-*

ing and Time. I argue that the failure of universalist and communitarian approaches in providing a substantive method for dealing with cross-cultural moral discourse as well as the failure of neo-Aristotelian accounts of global ethics in resolving the conceptual gap between rationality and human flourishing center around the metaphysical assumption of a free-standing subject detached from its world. I make a case for a Heideggerian alternative that not only avoids the pitfalls of our traditional approaches, but also explains why those pitfalls are inevitable. This alternative centers around Heidegger's term of *authenticity* as having both a structural and a normative dimension. I defend this interpretation by showing how alternative readings that deny a normative dimension contradict our textual evidence. On the normative reading, because authenticity is connected with *finitude*, it necessarily implies an ethical openness that provides us both the capacity to evaluate our own cultural practices and precludes any dogmatic adherence to one's own values. Through its connection with Heidegger's notion of *historicality*, I show how authenticity takes our inescapable cultural background not as an impediment but as a precondition for moral criticism and resolves ethical breakdowns by means of a *resolute* application of traditional forms of life to contemporary situations.

Reasons and intuitions in ethical debates

GIULIA CAVALIERE

KU Leuven (Belgium), Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands),
University of Padova (Italy)
giuli.cavaliere14@gmail.com

The contribution aims at showing how people confronted with ethical dilemmas in applied ethics are more inclined to behave as “intuitive lawyers” rather than “intuitive scientist” (Haidt 2001). Specifically, that there is a tendency to rely on intuitions in order to formulate moral judgments and to act as lawyers of one's own immediate emotional responses. However, it will be argued that, according to the rationalist model of moral reasoning and following the work of many moral philosophers (starting from the Ancient Greeks, Descartes, Mill and Kant, but also Gewirth 1980, Hare 1985, Korsgaard 1996), the process of formulating moral arguments should be assimilated to the work of a scientist. More precisely, scientists take steps

to test and verify their hypotheses; only after they prove those hypotheses right, they formulate a theory. According to the “scientist metaphor”, moral arguments are valid as long as they are formulated after rigorously following a step-by-step process and only if the latter evaluation process is done consciously. In fact, the first problem of relying solely on one’s intuitions is that they are often shaped by the social context and might be the direct result of prejudices, cultural conditioning or mere self-interest; a second issue is that intuitions and immediate emotional responses are often partial; people tend to feel empathy in respect of some agents than other for personal reasons. These are perfectly understandable and probably even valid to solve personal problems, but in the resolution of moral dilemmas, (bio)ethicists ought to aim at impartiality.

Is sexual ethics applied?

NENAD CEKIĆ

University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
(Belgrade, Serbia)
ncekic@f.bg.ac.rs

The title of this proposal is purposefully designed to draw attention to the somewhat problematic status of sexual ethics in contemporary philosophy and theoretical discussions. *Personal* sexual morality, which naturally *could* be a part of bioethics, is not often discussed in bioethical circles. Reasons for that fact may fall into two categories: (1) sexual morality is too practical, and (2) philosophy (mainly ethics) of sex involves issues that are too theoretical to be applied. Let us contrast these two provisory theses. (1) *For some philosophers, sexual issues were (or still are) not serious enough to be a part of philosophy or even a part of applied ethics.* We have to keep in mind that all parts of applied ethics, including today fashionable bioethics, have often been treated as the insignificant superficial outcome of some more fundamental moral dilemmas. In the course of time, some themes – like abortion, euthanasia and similar problems – become widely discussed. Finally, bioethics becomes a general topic of a number of variations of public discourse. However, *that* bioethics is often not an ethics (moral philosophy) at all. (2) *There is no sexual ethics. Moral problems related to sexual issues are part of general morality and a question for*

normative ethical theory. Problems like the moral status of sexual perversion, sexual fidelity or limits of sexual freedom openly occurred as philosophical issues in the philosophical literature during 1980's. Sexual ethics in the narrow sense is a philosophy that concerns: (a) meaning and use of general and specific value terms in sexual contexts (metaethics), and (b) philosophical research of the nature of personal relationships and various decisions in sexual contexts (normative ethics). Almost thirty years ago, Roger Scruton in the preface to his *Sexual Desire* wrote: "The subject of sexual desire has been largely ignored by modern philosophy". Today, it is still unclear to what particular area of expertise sexual ethics belongs. Metaethical analysis of value-charged terms used in sexual morality, such as "perversion", "adultery", "promiscuity" and similar ones is the first "source" of sexual ethics. The phenomenon of *human* sexual desire is the second source of sexual ethics. It is pretty much a matter of taste under what title we classify "sexual ethics" – applied ethics or general moral philosophy. The problems are the same.

Why should I say out loud if I've cognitively enhanced myself?

MIRKO DANIEL GARASIC

Harvard University – Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics (Cambridge, USA)

Tel Aviv University – Law Department (Tel Aviv, Israel)

mdgarasic@fulbrightmail.org

It is now well documented that the use of Cognitive Enhancers (CE) is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it has its peak in colleges (where the trend has been characterized as "academic doping"). Even when certain restrictions in the legislation of a country are indeed in place (i.e. through prescriptions requirements), they are without doubts easy to overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of this presentation. The concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western society: it is a fact that

an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders using CE. Through the use of some examples, the problems related to its use will be analyzed. In particular, focus will be given to the tension between one of the main arguments used by bio-liberals (the use of CE is an eligible procedure that society does not impose on anyone) and the actual implementation of the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts.

**Inferring intent from collective behavior:
some reflections on the recent ruling of the international
court of justice regarding the genocide convention violation**

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies,
Department of Philosophy & Department for Communication Science (Zagreb, Croatia)
tjanovic@hrstud.hr

Ascribing intentions to individuals – both in normative and descriptive contexts – is often a thankless task; ascribing intentions to collectives is almost always controversial. For, unlike its individual counterpart, the collective version of intentionality ascriptions is vitiated by two types of uncertainty: in addition to the general epistemological problem of inferring hidden (“mental”) motives from overt behavior, there arises the problem of showing how such motives, as constituents of individual acts, contribute to collective actions. Numerous attempts (e.g., Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, Toumela, etc.) to solve the latter problem – known as the collective action problem – have determined the course of philosophy of action in the past 25 years or so. At the basis of most of these attempts lies the observation that only in rare and specific cases can one be assured that the mental states of individuals involved in what seems to be an instance of collective action exhibit the right kind of *overlap* necessary to vindicate the assumption of collective intent. So how and when (under what circumstances) does this overlap come about? What factors (both conscious and unconscious) contribute to our conviction that it does come about (even when it doesn’t)? And how do these two problems affect our normative assessments of collective actions, especially those with grave and far-reaching consequences?

The example of collective behavior I will invoke to illustrate the importance of these questions – both for theoretical and practical purposes – is the case recently presented before the International Court of Justice in the process *Croatia vs. Serbia*. What makes the case philosophically intriguing – at least to my mind – is the explanation offered by the Court (in February 2015) for dismissing Croatia’s claim that Serbia has breached the Genocide Convention in the course of its armed aggression against Croatia (1991–1995). The crucial element in Court’s explanation of its decision – the element I will focus on in my contribution – is the alleged inability of the suitor to establish the existence of a special collective intent (*dolus specialis*) necessary for genocidal acts to be qualified as such. One doesn’t need to be an expert in complicity law to appreciate the implications of the view taken by the Court. One just needs to reflect on, among other issues, the problem of distinguishing the specific (in this case genocidal) intent from other potential intentions shared by persons involved in the same collective undertaking (in this case extreme and coordinated violence against discriminately targeted victims).

Practical rationality and instrumental learning in psychopaths

MARKO JURJAKO

University of Rijeka – Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Department of Philosophy (Rijeka, Croatia)
mjurjako@gmail.com

Heidi Maibom in her seminal paper has argued that some experimental evidence shows that psychopaths have an impaired practical rationality (Maibom 2005). The issue has an important place in recent philosophical debates. Sentimentalists maintain that these subjects exemplify the case of the immoral rational agent (Nichols 2004; Prinz 2006). Rationalists, instead, question the rationality of psychopaths (Maibom 2005, Maibom 2010; Kennett 2010). The outcome of this debate is relevant also for the discussion of the legal and moral responsibility of psychopathic offenders (Malatesti and McMillan 2010). In this paper I argue that transferring knowledge from these empirical investigations to solve the problem of the rationality of psychopaths requires taking stance on several conceptual is-

sues concerning the formulation of requirements of practical rationality. In the first part, I briefly survey experiments that show peculiarities in instrumental learning in psychopaths. Finally I advance the criticism of Maibom's interpretation of these experiments.

References: Kennett, J. 2010. "Reasons, Emotion, and Moral Judgment in the Psychopath." In Malatesti and McMillan 2010, 243–60.; Maibom, H. 2010. "Rationalism, emotivism, and the psychopath." In Malatesti and McMillan 2010, 227–241.; Maibom, H. L. 2005. "Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy." *Mind and Language* 20, 2: 237–257.; Malatesti, L. and J. McMillan eds. 2010. *Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nichols, S. 2004. *Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundation of Moral Judgement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Prinz, J. 2006. "The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgement." *Philosophical Explorations* 9, 1: 29–43.

Responsibility for climate change: does the argument from inconsequentialism extend to small countries?

FRIDERIK KLAMPFER

University of Maribor – Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy (Maribor, Slovenia)
friderik.klampfer@gmail.com

DEJAN SAVIĆ

University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy (Ljubljana, Slovenia)
dejan.svet@gmail.com

My personal contribution to the global threat of climate change is inconsequential – there is no discernible amount of harm (in the form of violent storms, floods, droughts, extreme weather conditions, and the like) that future people would be spared if I stopped using my car to get to work and started walking there instead. Hence, my driving to work is harmless and, consequentially, cannot be really deemed wrong. However, if this is the case, then it threatens to follow, counterintuitively, for sure, that I cannot be duty bound to give it up. Let's call this challenge against environmentalism the argument from inconsequentialism or AI for short. AI has recently attracted considerable attention among philosophers. While some were quick to dismiss it as a glaring example of fallacious reasoning or mistaken moral mathematics (Parfit 1985, Nefsky 2012), others were more sympathetic to it, either acknowledging its force and looking for alternatives to what

they saw as the dead end of a purely calculative, effect-oriented approach (Jamieson 2007, Sandler 2010) or admitting certain limitations and proposing necessary refinements to it (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010, Kagan 2011, Sandberg 2011). However, so far the discussion of AI's merits and demerits has been curiously confined to individual agents. In the paper, we take seriously Dale Jamieson's passing remark that "since *everyone, both individuals and nations*, can reason in this way, it appears that calculation leads to a downward spiral of non-cooperation" (our emphasis). We set out to test this hypothesis by first surveying the existing empirical data on GG emissions on national levels. The contributions of relatively small Balkan countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia, to global GG emissions and, consequently, to global warming and climate change, turn out to be fairly negligible (ranging from 0.05% for Slovenia to 0.1% for Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia respectively). So even if these countries drastically reduced their existing GG emissions, this wouldn't make the slightest bit of a difference to either global GG emissions or global warming (and, in perspective, climate change). Does this mean they (we) are morally off the hook? In the paper, we consider, and evaluate, possible environmentalist replies to the above challenge (which we call the statist version of AI): mainly consequentialist (in terms of imperceptible, contributory, collective/aggregate or side-effects), but also deontological (in terms of culpability for past emissions, future emission rights, fair share of burden or equal sacrifice). Applying AI to nations turns out to be fruitful. Rather than leading to "a downward spiral of non-cooperation", it identifies countries, the smallest among them included, as basic carriers of environmental obligations (with individuals as carriers of derivative obligations). We further strengthen the case for environmental obligations of small nations by way of analogy with another pressing social ill, the obesity epidemics. We show how a multitude of agents, both individual and collective, with fairly diverse causal contributions and powers to act is no obstacle to a division of responsibility and/or assignment of accountability for climate change mitigation that is both minimally fair/just and efficient.

Misdirected means of moral bioenhancement

KAROLINA KUDLEK

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies,
Department of Philosophy (Zagreb, Croatia)
kkudlek@hrstud.hr

Proponents of the moral bioenhancement argue that the gap between scientific and technological progress, achieved by human species during the past few centuries, and the absence of comparable progress in our species-typical moral psychology, presents a serious threat for the survival of human species. They believe that our moral psychology was naturally selected for living conditions of the distant past, but did not evolve ever since to help us deal with and adapt to the modern world environment and challenges. They suggest, therefore, that knowledge of human genetics and neurobiology should be used to directly improve our moral motivation via biomedical means, i.e. that moral bioenhancement could modulate the core of our moral dispositions which, allegedly, consists of altruistic emotions and the sense of justice. The plausibility of this proposal will be assessed by its comparison with certain evolutionary psychological views of emotions, especially with the theory that emotions evolved as a special class of biological adaptations (or programs) with the task to superordinate other, more basic, adaptive mechanisms of human psychology in order to promote one's fitness. Assuming the plausibility of this view of emotions, it will be argued in this paper that several difficulties for moral bioenhancement theory emerge from this comparison. The main problem to be discussed is how exactly any type of moral bioenhancement directed at modulating moral emotions might solve the problem of our outdated moral psychology. While the proposal of moral bioenhancement presupposes that enhancing moral motivation via modulating emotions will directly solve the problem of maladjusted mechanisms of our moral psychology, it will be argued that this solution, due to several conceptual and empirical reasons provided by evolutionary psychology of emotions, is most likely misdirected.

Ethics of nudging. Finding the criteria for when nudging is acceptable

MIHOVIL LUKIĆ

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies,
Department of Philosophy (Zagreb, Croatia)
mihovil.lukic@yahoo.com

The concept of *nudging*, proposed by Thaler and Sunstein, suggests that we should push people towards making decisions which will, by their own standards, make them “better off”. We should nudge people towards making better decisions using findings from empirical research in social sciences and cognitive science. *Influencing people’s decision-making processes* is a broader term than nudging. We can influence people to make decisions which will not make them better off. To answer the question when nudging is acceptable, I will answer the lower level question: When is influencing decision-making processes acceptable? Influencing the decision-making processes could be acceptable always, never, or sometimes. I believe it is acceptable sometimes and I will demonstrate it using two imaginary examples, one which is obviously acceptable, and one which obviously isn’t. Using these two examples, and some other examples which are not so obviously acceptable or not acceptable, I will propose criteria with which we can evaluate if any example of influencing the decision-making processes is acceptable or not acceptable (and from those acceptable, which are preferable and which are not). These criteria are rooted in two widely accepted concepts in contemporary ethics – the concept of autonomy and the concept of well-being. Finally, I will apply these criteria on the theoretical framework of nudging, as well as on some examples of nudging from the U.K. and the U.S. More often than not, I will conclude, nudging does not meet these criteria.

Altruism in the Cloud – why do we help strangers online?

DIJANA MAGĐINSKI

University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies,
Department of Philosophy (Zagreb, Croatia)
dijana_magdinski@yahoo.com

Internet based distributed problem solving collaborations and various social activities, such as crowdsourcing and commons-based peer production, are dominantly motivated by external rewards and self-oriented motives (e.g. money, personal development, fun). However, contemporary research regarding such activities often states altruism as one of the motivators. This notion of altruism refers to the psychologically altruistic behaviors, that is, behaviors which are motivated by ultimate desires for the well-being of others. It is often argued that psychological altruism can evolve only in special cases, specifically, helping behavior towards kin and helping behavior towards non-kin in an ongoing reciprocal relationship. Given that altruistic online interactions are almost exclusively with, usually anonymous, non-kin and quite often don't include reciprocity, they cannot be easily explained by kin selection and reciprocity theories. In this paper I will examine possible explanations of "altruism in the Cloud" and explore implications on psychological egoism vs. psychological altruism debate as well as on research concerning evolutionary and psychological altruism.

Personhood in disorder of consciousness and its ethical implications

KRITIKA MAHESHWARI

University of Birmingham – Department of Philosophy (Birmingham, United Kingdom)
KXM493@student.bham.ac.uk

Several concepts of personhood proposed in literature (Beauchamp, 1999) consider presence of consciousness or some form of conscious capacity as one of the many accountable criteria for personhood. However, there is no consensus among philosophers and ethicists on these criteria so as to concede to one universal definition for personhood. In this talk, I will focus on the implications of this problem of concept of personhood in cases of

brain-damaged patients who are in the clinically defined condition of vegetative state (VS). Traditional theories of personhood conclude withdrawal of moral consideration of personhood of these patients, as they are considered to show no signs of conscious experience and awareness. However, I challenge this view on the basis of empirical studies (Owen, 2006) which show that the patients in fact may have residual levels of cognition or conscious capacity. Next, I argue that accounts of personhood which are fully committed to the idea that loss of aspects of consciousness is an absolute marker for loss of personhood are implausible. Therefore, in the light of advances and prospects in medical studies, I will deduce and support the following argument:

- P1) Presence of consciousness is a crucial criterion for personhood.
- P2) Patients in VS have some form of consciousness.
- C) Patients in VS satisfy the criteria for personhood.

Based on the established conclusion, I will finally discuss ethical implications of this view of personhood in the case of VS patients on treatment decisions and health care allocation issues.

Self-knowledge and moral responsibility: the case of psychopathy

LUCA MALATESTI & FILIP ČEČ

University of Rijeka – Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Department of Philosophy (Rijeka, Croatia)
lucamalatesti@gmail.com fcec@ffri.hr

In recent years the issue of the legal and moral responsibility of persons classified as having psychopathy has attracted increasing and considerable philosophical attention (Schaich Kiehl, Kent A. and Sinnott-Armstrong, W. P., eds. 2013). This raise of interest is motivated by the remarkable scientific advancement in the study of psychopathy (Patrick 2006) combined with the mounting pressure of the practical problem of the social response to psychopathic offenders and those with antisocial personality disorder. In this paper, we will argue that the current philosophical debate on the moral responsibility of psychopaths has unduly neglected the issue of the integ-

rity of their self-identity. Specifically, we will maintain that it should be investigated whether these subjects are impaired in ways that affect some basic epistemic requirements for forms of self-knowledge that are relevant for self-identity, and, thus, moral agency and responsibility. Besides arguing for the importance of the suggested direction of research, we will also offer some evidence to conclude that, if we focus on certain prerequisite epistemic capacities, psychopathy might involve an impairment of self-identity. Specifically, we will argue that one of the central requirements for self-identity is the capacity for “mental time travel”. We will maintain that there is some empirical evidence for the conclusion that psychopaths might be impaired in this latter capacity.

Values in psychotherapeutic relationship

KATARZYNA MARCHEWKA

Jagiellonian University – Institute of Philosophy (Kraków, Poland)
katarzyna.kinga.marchewka@gmail.com

Values play an important role in psychology, but they have even more significant role in process of psychotherapy (e.g., Jensen, Bergin, 1988; Doherty, 1995; Tjeltveit, 1999). This role stems from the essence of psychotherapy, which regards for the most intimate problems of the other person and affects how the person sees himself or herself and his or her relationship with other people. The first aim of the presentation is to present the results of empirical research which refer to the issue of values in psychotherapy. The results will be supplemented by theoretical considerations about the role and importance of the relationship between psychotherapist and his or her client. Values that influence therapists’ professional work (e.g., Jensen, Bergin 1988, 1990; Gius, Coin, 2000) and their impact on clients’ values (*convergence value*) (e.g., Rosenthal, 1955; Kelly, Strupp, 1992) will be discussed. The results of empirical research and theoretical considerations will show that psychotherapy is a relationship full of ethical dilemmas and moral evaluation of human behavior. The role which values play in the effectiveness of psychotherapy and difficulty in maintaining an attitude of therapist neutrality will be stressed. As a result, the second aim of the presentation is to present several different strategies to deal with values during

psychotherapy (*value management strategies*), for example: the attitude known as *explicit valuing minimizing styles* (Richards, Rector, Tjeltveit, 1999) or the strategy named *value atomization* (Williams, Levitt, 2007).

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Epistemology and ethical considerations of neuroscience

OLGA MARKIČ

University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy (Ljubljana, Slovenia)
olga.markic@guest.arnes.si

The mechanistic approach of neuroscience is nowadays a prevailing viewpoint in the scientific study of the mind. It gives us fascinating results but at the same time starts to question some basic assumptions about ourselves and our place in nature. In this paper I will discuss some ethical considerations and implications that come from such an approach. I will point out that there are different frameworks for understanding the mind embedded in different cultural environments and argue for a broader understanding and interpretation of the results of the scientific research. Science is often seen as a discourse of experts, driven by objective knowledge and free of value. But, particularly in the cognitive science, it is impossible to eliminate philosophical and cultural background. Science thus brings also reactions based on personal belief and culture and includes applications and

values sustaining them. Because of the complexity and various sources of ethical concerns, I will stress the importance of multidirectional communication between scientists and philosophers to explicate the assumptions on which the research and interpretations are based. Such analysis may overcome too reductionist understanding of the neuroscientific research. I will argue that ethical, legal and social considerations of neuroscientific research are closely intertwined with the epistemological issues – what neuroscientific data mean.

Agricultural biotechnology, genetic modification and ethical issues

KONSTANTINA MYLONA-GIANNAKAKOU

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens – School of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy (Athens, Greece)
dinmyl@otenet.gr

The advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering in the field of agricultural biology promise to solve once and for all the problems concerning food shortage and malnutrition; on the other hand, they have given raise to new moral issues. In this paper I will argue in support of certain technological advances in agricultural biology; to do this I intent to adopt consequential perspective in order to examine risk analysis-, risk governance- and slippery slope-type arguments concerning potential benefits and hazards. I will argue that biotechnology and genetic engineering in the field of agricultural biology may indeed prove to be the only possible long term solution to food production related issues, a fact that – as I will claim – outweighs potential hazards. I will conclude with my view that, as far as the potential hazards are concerned, moral vigilance together with constant regulation are of utter necessity with regard to issues such as the genetic modification in agriculture.

The notion of harm in reproductive ethics

ALINA OMERBASIC

University of Potsdam – Department of Philosophy (Potsdam, Germany)
alomer@uni-potsdam.de

The starting point of this paper is the assumption that individuals should be given some room in reproductive decision-making – that there is “reproductive freedom”. In respect of the ever-growing possibilities in artificial reproductive technologies the question arises what this freedom exactly consists of and where its limits lie. It makes sense to fix these limits on the basis of the principle of nonmaleficence. But then we need to clarify when resulting children are harmed by their parents’ reproductive decisions. By pointing out to the now famous *Non-identity problem* Derek Parfit showed that this proves to be very difficult in so called “genesis” or “non-identity”-cases. In the context of reproduction these are cases in which some undesired conditions or traits like incurable genetic disorders are inevitably tied to the conception and therefore the existence of a child. No matter how questionable, unreasonable or even negligent the parents’ decision was, which lead to the birth of the affected child, following the *person-affecting harm principle* it is not harmed by their decision. Consequently, it is not legitimate to intervene in the prospective parents’ reproductive freedom. Following Parfit and Dan Brock, it is argued that a promising – but also controversial – solution consists in the departure from a mere person-affecting harm principle in non-identity-cases simply because such principles cannot capture the moral wrong done in these cases. The moral wrong done does not consist in the reduction of a particular individual’s well-being. Apparently we are concerned with another “category” of harm, which is best captured by a *non-person-affecting harm principle*.

When should we allow choice architectures? Behavioral economics and politics

DARKO POLŠEK

University of Zagreb – Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Department of Anthropology (Zagreb, Croatia)
dpolsek@ffzg.hr

Are we justified in framing people's decisions in order to correct their predictable irrationalities? One would assume so. Thaler and Sunstein claimed that individuals and society would be better off if we accepted "libertarian paternalism", i.e. if some external agency (most notably – the state) steered people's decision-making in such a way that people make "the right" or "rational" choices. They call this kind of decision-steering – "architecture of choice". The chosen ends are sometimes unproblematic. The easy test is simply to ask people what they "really" wanted (to lose weight, to stop smoking). We may even a priori agree with them what the rational outcome of a decision should be. But since people use "bounded" rationality, behavioral economics proved that in the range of important situations people simply do not make rational choices. And although upon reflection we may objectively see what the rational decision should be, there are a number of issues with Thaler's and Sunstein's "choice architectures". First: who should play the rational surrogate? Who should be able to frame people's common or life-important decisions? The state? The corporation? Neighborhood? Parents? Friends? Secondly: Should we protect people against their lesser judgment at all? Is anybody legally entitled to strip away the agency from subjects? Do we not violate their rights to exercise their autonomy? Thirdly: Steering of people's choices is a manipulation thereof. How do we decide *prima facie* when to use "architecture of choice", and when to leave people on their own? The paper addresses these questions.

Truth-telling and medical duty: placebo treatments and potential moral conflicts

EVANGELOS PROTOPAPADAKIS

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens – School of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy (Athens, Greece)
eprotopa@ppp.uoa.gr

Those who hold the view that lying is *categorically* unjustifiable do so primarily on grounds of a Kantian approach to autonomy: lying means casting shadow on some of the options one has, therefore compromising one's autonomy. Under such a Kantian perspective truth-telling can be nothing less than a perfect moral duty, and this applies to doctors no less than anybody else. In this paper I will focus exclusively on the so-called placebo treatments in order to argue that there might be some cases in medical practice in which the doctor's commitment to the autonomy of the patient could even prove to be abusive, especially when it conflicts with other duties that seem to be of greater moral significance. I will conclude that the notion of autonomy, when it comes to medical ethics, sometimes seems to be somewhat overestimated, even when it is being judged under the light of the Kantian tradition.

Meaning in life and life extension

ROSA RANTANEN

University of Turku – Department of Philosophy (Turku, Finland)
rprant@utu.fi

Due to political and societal changes as well as medical development, our average life expectancy has increased notably during the recent decades. New and emerging technologies might enable people to live for tens – or even hundreds – of years longer in the future. Although this kind of suggestion is scientifically problematic, there is a real possibility that our average life expectancy will keep increasing considerably. This raises a worry about the quality of life that we would be looking at. Slogans such as “not years to life but life to years” have emerged in the discussion about quality of life in the context of end-of-life care. But whereas the discussion on

quality of life in end-of-life care mostly considers elderly and/or severely ill people, the discussion about quality of life in the context of life extension needs not to be limited in such cases. However, it is important to think about what makes an extended life worth living – or what, if anything, makes life worth extending in the first place. I suggest that *meaningfulness* is a central concept in defining what quality of life consists of. My central question is: How important is the concept of meaning in life in terms of deciding whether we see life extension as a morally acceptable (or even desirable) option? As a conclusion, I suggest that meaningfulness is a useful concept in the context of life extension, and brings additional value to the ethical discussion on the issue.

Setting limits to research risk

JOANNA ROZYNSKA

University of Warsaw – Department of Ethics & Institute of Philosophy
(Warsaw, Poland)
jrozynska@gmail.com

The aim of my presentation is to decide: (1) whether there should be any limit to the level of risk in “non-therapeutic” research involving healthy volunteers; and (2) if yes, whether it is possible to determine *a priori* such a maximal risk threshold. First, I will argue that there are two features of research in general, and research on healthy volunteers in particular, which justify imposition of limits on permissible research risks, namely [i] the social mission and complex collaborative nature of research enterprise, and [ii] the inequity of power between researchers/sponsors and subjects due to asymmetries in information allocation and control, risk allocation and control, and economic position. Second, I will critically analyze three approaches to setting research risk ceiling that have been developed in the literature: [i] a comparative approach based on a principle proposed by Alex London that the risk of “non-therapeutic” research should not be greater than the risks of “other socially sanctioned activities that are similar in structure to the research enterprise”; [ii] a pragmatic-oriented “numerical strategy” aimed at indicating a precise risk threshold defended by David Resnik, and [iii] a process approach adopted by the Additional Protocol to

the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Biomedical Research (2005) that leaves the judgment of risk acceptability to REC/IRB discretion. I will claim that the last approach is the best strategy to set boundaries of risk in “non-therapeutic” research.

Psychiatric medicalization and oppression

LOVRO SAVIĆ

University of Groningen – Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Ethics,
Social and Political Philosophy (Groningen, Netherlands)
l.savic@student.rug.nl

In this talk I defend a thesis that medicalization in psychiatry can never be a good thing, and is therefore always wrong. My argument in support of this thesis will be formulated as follows:

- P1) Oppression is (morally) wrong
- P2) Medicalization in psychiatry is a form of oppression
- C1) Therefore, medicalization in psychiatry is wrong.

In the first part of the talk I will provide a brief historical overview of an unjust and morally impermissible forms of psychiatric practice such as activities conducted by psychiatrists in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and China and how those practices fit neatly into definition “oppression”. In the second part of the talk I will provide a hybrid theory of oppression which can be seen as a conjunction of a theory of (i) epistemic oppression defended by Miranda Fricker (2013) and (ii) theory of oppression put forward by Ann E. Cudd, according to whom the oppression represents “the fundamental injustice” (2006: 20) and incorporates four necessary and sufficient conditions: harm condition, the social group condition, the privilege condition and coercion condition. This way I hope to argue against Eric Parens who claimed that we should “get over the traditional assumption that medicalization is bad per se, and try to articulate the difference between *good and bad forms of it*” (2011: 2, my italics) and present *current* medicalization in psychiatry as a clear counter-example. Finally, I will address two possible objections which take into account a psychiatric expertise and widely acknowledged goals of medicine, and show why both of those objections fail.

Is the sexualization of girlhood a social pathology?

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER

University of Salzburg – Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research (Salzburg, Austria)
Gottfried.Schweiger@sbg.ac.at

The sexualization of girlhood and girls has been identified as an increasing issue in western countries and gained attention from academics as well as from the public and concerned parents. In this contribution I want to take a different perspective and examine the sexualization of girlhood as a social pathology, a concept of social criticism proposed by Critical Theory and recently re-formulated by such scholars as Axel Honneth. In particular I want to argue that the sexualization of girlhood can be understood as a second-order pathology – instead of a first-order pathology – which means that it is rooted in a distortion of the social norms and practices in which personal beliefs and practices are embedded. I argue that the first-order claims of authenticity and individuality, which are expressed through the sexualized behavior of girls, are in true second-order demands imposed on girlhood to express a certain image of femininity associated with sexyness. As with all social pathologies certain claims of recognition which are deemed valuable such as authentic self-expression and social inclusion are invaded by capitalistic-consumerist aesthetic and social norms of what counts as normal. I will argue such a criticism does not rest on an external gods-eye view of “true” authenticity and individuality or a thick concept of a good girlhood. Rather I follow a negative approach in which the harm – in particular psychological distress and effects on the self-esteem and self-worth of girls – caused by sexualization points us towards its wrongness, and from that I move on to mobilize those norms of authenticity and individualization once more against their distortion by second-order pathologies.

Normative aspects of decision-making frameworks under uncertainty

HARALD STELZER

Karl Franzens University Graz – Department of Philosophy (Graz, Austria)
harald.stelzer@uni-graz.at

Although humans often respond successfully to uncertainty based on their intuitions about the system in question as well as on past experiences, in a world confronted with rapid and potentially profound transitions driven by social, economic, environmental, and technological change we have to deal with new situations unprecedented in the past. Not only for long-term policymaking we have to look for decision-making frameworks that are able (or better able) to deal with uncertainty. This is also the case if we choose among near-term actions that will shape the options available to future generations. Research in this area is not only rewarding by the possibility to contribute to tackle future problems for humanity but it is also of the greatest interest for practical philosophy itself. Our current normative theories are ill-equipped to deal with many of the ethical issues raised by the Anthropocene, especially when it comes to long-term future impacts and decision-making under uncertainty. My concern is hereby how to include normative considerations in decision-making frameworks that help to enhance ethical criteria rather than making them dogmatic and therefore hard to follow in practice. Normative based approaches like “maximin” or the “precautionary principles” are too often too restrictive or ambiguous, which makes them in some cases politically and economically unfeasible. In the talk I will provide a short overview over different decision-making frameworks such as cost-benefit analyses, cost-effectiveness analyses, cost-risk analyses, robust decision making, integrated assessment models as well as guardrail, tolerable windows and safe landing approaches, and their merits and shortcomings when it comes to uncertainty. I will then try to combine the guardrail approach with a multidimensional consequentialism, as I have developed it with Fabian Schuppert. I believe that such an approach can work with normative thresholds and is therefore promising, to enable us to include ethical issues in decision-making under uncertainty.

Biographical Notes

RADIM BĚLOHRAD is an assistant professor of philosophy at Masaryk University, Czech Republic. His primary research focus is on personal identity and related ethical issues. Apart from personal identity, he has taught courses on normative, applied and meta-ethics, philosophy of language, and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy.

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ studied philosophy at the University of Zagreb – Department of Philosophy of the Center for Croatian Studies, where he obtained his BA (1998), MA (2001) and PhD (2005). Since 2013 he is associate professor of philosophy in the same department. He published a monograph on evolutionary explanations of morality and a number of articles in both Croatian and international philosophy journals. His research interests lie in ethics, applied ethics, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of biology. Since 2014 he is member of the UNESCO's World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (Commission mondiale d'éthique des connaissances scientifiques et des technologies).

WALDEMAR BRYS is currently a graduate student at the Humboldt University of Berlin. He earned his Bachelor's degree in Philosophy and History from the Free University Berlin and specializes in 19th century German philosophy, Heidegger, Aristotle, normative ethics and metaethics. He has given presentations on Nietzsche and moral theory at King's College London, Linköping University in Sweden and the Second Congress of Philosophy at the University of Osnabrück in Germany.

GIULIA CAVALIERE enrolled the BA Program of Philosophy at the University of Bologna (Italy) and obtained her degree in 2011. She then enrolled for the Master in Ethics and Politics at the University of Trento. Additionally, she was admitted to the College for Excellence Bernardo Clesio, a highly selective academic institution whose aim is to improve the interdisciplinary preparation of its students. In September 2014, she started the Erasmus Mundus Master Program of Bioethics (EMMB), a European Program held in three different Universities: KU Leuven, Radboud University and University of Padova. Her *iter studiorum* has reinforced her will to start a career in applied ethics and she therefore applied for the PhD in Philosophy at Reading University and she will start there in September 2015.

NENAD CEKIĆ was born in Belgrade in 1963. He completed graduate and postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University, obtaining his PhD in Philosophy in 2003. Since 2013 he is the Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy at the same faculty where he teaches courses on ethics, metaethics, applied ethics, bioethics and moral epistemology. Chairman of the Ethical Committee of Serbian Philosophical Society. Member of the International Forum of Teachers (UNESCO Chair in Bioethics). Member of the Editorial Board of Belgrade *Philosophical Studies*. Member of the Scientific Board of Belgrade Institute of Philosophy. Former Chairman and a member of the Council of Serbian Republic Broadcasting Agency (2003–2011). Former Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Serbian Philosophical Society. One of the three authors of the high school textbook for philosophy in the Republic of Serbia.

FILIP ČEČ is a junior researcher in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Rijeka. He graduated in philosophy at the University of Rijeka and received a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Rijeka. His research interests are the metaphysical problems of free will and of personal identity.

MIRKO DANIEL GARASIC was, before joining the Safra Center for Ethics at Tel Aviv University, affiliated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as a Golda Meir Postdoctoral Fellow and had a very productive period as an Erasmus Mundus Fellow at the Center for Human Bioethics at Monash University. He is currently working on a number of bioethical and biopolitical projects focused on human enhancement, male circumcision, hunger strikes, and neuroethics. During his Post-Doctorate Fellowship at the Safra Center for Ethics, his main project will focus on Emotional Enhancement. While recognizing the therapeutic use that emotional modulation can have in treating psychiatric disorders and neurodegenerative diseases, his contention is that we should not implement such biotechnologies as emotional enhancers: not only we would be putting at risk some intrinsic richness in our way of experiencing life, but we would also drastically reduce the spectrum of actual possibilities for future individuals. His first book is expected to be published in summer 2015. Among other journals, his works have appeared in *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *The Hastings Center Report*, *The Journal of Medical Ethics and Medicine*, *Health Care*, and *Philosophy*.

DAVID HEYD is Chaim Perelman Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Heyd's main fields of interests are ethics, political philosophy and bioethics. His publications include *Supererogation* (Cambridge, 1982), *Genethics* (Berkeley, 1992), an edited volume *Toleration* (Princeton, 1996) as well as more recent papers on intergenerational, historical and global justice. Beyond his philosophical work, Heyd has taken part in numerous government and institutional committees on bioethical subjects like surrogacy, the dying patient, research ethics, technologies of assisted parenthood and served on the National Council for Bioethics in Israel.

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Communication Science at the University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies. His interests range from philosophy of mind and philosophy of social science to ethics and communication theory. He taught or teaches courses in all those disciplines. He wrote 15 scientific articles and more than 10 professional papers and book reviews, both in Croatian and English. He also presented 20 papers at international conferences.

MARKO JURJAKO is a junior researcher in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Rijeka. He graduated in philosophy at the University of Rijeka and received his master diploma at the Central European University in Budapest. Currently he is enrolled as a PhD student at the Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka. His research interests are evolution of morality, moral judgment, rationality and naturalistic approaches to philosophy.

FRIDERIK KLAMPFER is associate professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in Maribor. He published three books (one in co-authorship) and numerous journal articles and book chapters, mainly in applied and normative ethics, moral epistemology and political philosophy. He is currently working on a consequentialist alternative to traditional, desert-based accounts of moral responsibility.

KAROLINA KUDLEK is a PhD student at the Center for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. At the same institution she received her B.A. in Philosophy and Croatology in 2008, and her M.A. in Philosophy in 2011. She worked as an associate for the scientific and publishing activities at the

Society for the Advancement of Philosophy. In 2012 she enrolled the post-graduate doctoral study of philosophy at the Center for Croatian Studies and is currently working toward her PhD thesis. Her fields of scientific interest are applied ethics and bioethics, with special emphasis on the intersection between neuroscience and moral philosophy.

MIHOVIĆ LUKIĆ was born in 1987 in Zagreb, Croatia. In Zagreb he also finished his primary and secondary schooling. He completed his undergraduate and graduate studies at the Center for Croatian Studies of University of Zagreb. Currently he is a PhD student of philosophy, also at the Center for Croatian Studies.

DIJANA MAGĐINSKI (B.A., M.A. in philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb) is a PhD student at the Department of Philosophy, Centre for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. Her primary research interests are philosophy of biology and evolutionary theory with emphasis on evolution of cooperation, units of selection and adaptationism.

KRITIKA MAHESHWARI is a full time postgraduate student at the Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham (UK). She is currently pursuing MA in philosophy of mind and cognitive science (one year), after having finished her BSc. Chemistry (Honors) from University of Delhi, India. After successfully finishing two fellowships in scientific research in neurological disorders during her undergraduate years, she chose to pursue a philosophy course for addressing issues in philosophy of mind, bioethics and neuroethics. This was enabled by the international postgraduate scholarship awarded by the University of Birmingham. She has recently participated as student speaker at a residential student conference, organized by the philosophy department. After her masters course, she aims to pursue a PhD, focusing on issues in neuroethics.

LUCA MALATESTI is assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Rijeka, where he holds the chair of Philosophy of Mind. He graduated in philosophy at the University of Florence, received an MA in Philosophy of Mind at the University of Hull and a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. His research interests are in philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychiatry.

KATARZYNA MARCHEWKA is a PhD student in Psychology at the Jagiellonian University and she also works as a scientific assistant in the Department Professional Ethics (the Institute of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University). Prior to beginning her doctoral studies, she studied psychology and ethics. Her research interests include: professional ethics in psychology, psychotherapy (especially cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy), ethics in psychotherapy (especially values in psychotherapy and neutrality principle in psychotherapy), philosophy of psychology and qualitative methodology in psychology. Her current research focuses on values in cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy. She is member of the Polish Psychological Association.

OLGA MARKIČ is Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. She received her PhD from the University of Ljubljana in 1998. She is teaching at the Department of Philosophy and at the interdisciplinary Master program in Cognitive Science, University of Ljubljana. She has been visiting professor at the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science, Eötvös University. She currently works on topics in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science and neuroethics.

KONSTANTINA MYLONA-GIANNAKAKOU was born in Athens in 1970. She studied philosophy, pedagogy and psychology at the University of Athens, where she obtained her Bachelor of English Studies in 1994. Since 1996 she holds an AMBA and EPAS accredited Master of Business Administration from the internationally recognized graduate business school of ALBA. In 2014 she received her Master of Philosophy at the University of Athens, where she is currently a PhD student. She has over eighteen years of marketing and business development expertise and has held several prominent positions within multinational companies in the Greek food sector. From 2000 to 2004 she worked as a strategic consultant in Red Design Consultants that won the international competition for designing the XXVIII Olympics emblem.

ERIC T. OLSON grew up in the US and studied at Reed College and Syracuse University. He was a lecturer at the University of Cambridge from 1995 to 2003 and is now professor at the University of Sheffield. He is best known for his work on the metaphysics personal identity, where he advocates “animalism”: the view that we are biological organisms. This

has important ethical implications, and is as controversial among ethicists as it is among metaphysicians. In recent years he has been thinking about the significance of death.

ALINA OMERBASIC is currently teaching and research assistant at the Department of Philosophy, University of Potsdam. Master degree in Philosophy, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf in 2014; Fixed term lecturer at the University Duisburg-Essen in 2014; Bachelor degree in Philosophy and Musicology, Heinrich-Heine-University and Robert-Schumann-School of Music and Media, Düsseldorf in 2011. Main areas of interest: Applied ethics, Schopenhauer.

DARKO POLŠEK is a tenured professor at the Department of Anthropology (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb). Master's Thesis in epistemology and a PhD in sociology of science. Previous teaching posts at Sociology Department (University of Zadar) and Sociology Department (School of Law, Zagreb) and at several other schools and departments. Scholarships: Fulbright (Blacksburg VA, 1997), University of Oxford (2001), DAAD (Heidelberg 1984); OEAD (Graz, 1990). Guest lectures at London School of Economics (Popper 1997), CEU Budapest (1995–1997); Salzburg Seminar (1995); University of Cambridge (2004), New America Foundation (Washington 2001). 1997–2011 Course Director of the Inter-University Center Dubrovnik Seminar “Sociology of the Sciences”. Member of the board of the Croatian Philosophical Association (1995), and the Croatian Sociology Association (1996).

EVANGELOS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS was born in Athens in 1972. He studied philosophy, pedagogy and psychology at the University of Athens, where he obtained his B.Phil in 1997. He received his PhD in 2002 for a thesis titled *The Idea of Euthanasia in Contemporary Bioethics*, supervised by Prof. T. N. Pelegrinis. He has been teaching at the University of Athens since 2004 (as appointed and part time lecturer). In 2009 he was elected Lecturer in Applied Ethics at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. In 2012 he was elected Member of the Board and General Secretary of the Greek Philosophical Society. In 2014 he was elected Assistant Professor of Applied Ethics at the University of Athens. He has authored four books in Greek, edited one in English, and co-edited two in Greek and one in Serbian.

ROSA RANTANEN has received her M. Soc. Sci. degree in philosophy in 2011 and is currently finishing her Doctoral Thesis on the ethics of considerable life extension at the University of Turku, Finland. The thesis scrutinizes ethical problems related to human life extension by medical technologies, providing a critical overview on the discussion. She has published many articles on the issue and presented in multiple international conferences in different countries. She is also interested in promoting bioethics in the academia and in the society; she is the General Secretary of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics Finnish Unit as well as the Coordinator of International Cooperation of the Center for the Study of Bioethics based in Belgrade, Serbia.

JOANNA ROZYSKA is a holder of academic degrees in Philosophy (PhD, MA), Law (MJur), Sociology (MA), and Bioethics (MS). She is an Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy (Ethics, Bioethics), and an Assistant Professor at the Warsaw University of Physical Education (Bioethics, Medical Law). She is also a senior faculty member of the Fogarty-funded Advanced Certificate Program: E-Education in Research Ethics Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by the Union Graduate College/Mount Sinai School of Medicine Bioethics Program, NY, USA & Department of Medical History and Ethics at the Medical Faculty of Vilnius University, Lithuania. She is a member of the Committee on Ethics in Healthcare System at the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Poland; member and the Secretary of the Bioethics Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences; member of the National Committee for Cooperation with the European Network of Research Integrity Offices; and the Head of the Polish Unit of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics. She is one of the organizers and lecturers of the first Polish Master Programme in Bioethics at the University of Warsaw. Her research addresses ethical and legal issues in clinical research and in reproductive medicine.

DEJAN SAVIĆ is a PhD student in philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana. His research interests are in intergenerational justice, political philosophy, environmental ethics and climate ethics. For the last five years he has worked for Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe as a climate and energy expert.

LOVRO SAVIĆ obtained his bachelor degree in philosophy and history at the Centre for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. He is currently a

research masters student in philosophy at the University of Groningen, Netherlands. He has published articles and book reviews in *Philologoi*, *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior* and *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*. His interests include philosophy of psychiatry, psychiatric ethics and bioethics.

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research, University of Salzburg, where he is the principal investigator of the project “Social Justice and Child Poverty”, funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). He published on poverty, unemployment, recognition, social justice, tax justice, and justice in professional sports.

HARALD STELZER is professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Graz. He received his doctoral degree from the University of Graz in 2003, as well as his *Venia legendi* in 2013. He has worked on the social and political philosophy of Karl Popper and Critical Rationalism, as well as on the development of the outline of a critical rational ethics. In the years 2013 and 2014 he has worked at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Potsdam (Germany) on the ethical and political implications of climate engineering. He works on problems and opportunities of the normative evaluation of political courses of action under special consideration of uncertainty and risks. He also researches questions about heterogeneity and cohesion in modern societies in the course of critically disputing communitarian positions. Latest book: *Zur Kritik der kommunitaristischen Moralphilosophie* (2015).

Our Previous Conferences

- 2014 *Language, Mind, and Knowledge* (Zagreb)
- 2013 *Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference 2013* (Zagreb)
- 2012 *Identity in the Context of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy* (Dubrovnik)
- 2011 *Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference 2011* (Zagreb)
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Organizing Committee

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University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies – Department of Philosophy
tomislav.bracanovic@hrstud.hr

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Society for the Advancement of Philosophy, Zagreb
kkudlek@hrstud.hr

RADIM BĚLOHRAD

Masaryk University in Brno, Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy
radimbelohrad@gmail.com

TOMISLAV JANOVIĆ

University of Zagreb, Center for Croatian Studies –
Department of Philosophy & Department for Communication Science
tjanovic@hrstud.hr

FRIDERIK KLAMPFER

University of Maribor, Faculty of Arts – Department of Philosophy
friderik.klampfer@gmail.com

LUCA MALATESTI

University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences –
Department of Philosophy
lucamalatesti@gmail.com

HARALD STELZER

Karl Franzens University Graz – Department of Philosophy
harald.stelzer@uni-graz.at

PUBLISHERS

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EDITORS

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